part of the working-class population. Yet the majority of lower-and middle-income families remained out of both the existing projects and the private market for prospective homeowners. 2 The National Housing Agency (NHA), in 1944, published a projection on U.S. housing needs for the first decade after the war, based on the estimations of population increases, returning veterans, doubling-up married families, and substandard units. It estimated that only a half of the total 12.6 million new dwellings could be accomplished by the established private industries using FHA aids.
3 Working-class families feared income decreases that might follow the end of wartime production and cost increases after the end of rent control. In large cities, evictions and rent hikes had threatened great numbers of working-class tenants. 4 It was therefore reasonable for housing reform advocates in the 1940s to seek to expand and reinforce public housing policy. Meanwhile, opponents of public housing gained confidence in building a broad-based homeownership society after World War II. A political alliance between conservative Republicans and southern Democrats, in tandem with real estate and bank lobbies, had generated a strong headwind against liberal housing reforms. The Veterans' Emergency Housing Program, which intended to facilitate through price controls construction of affordable housing for veterans, was wound down by the end of 1946.
The Wagner-Ellender-Taft housing bill, the other postwar program aiming at a half-million units of public housing within a four-year period, had been blocked at the House Banking and Currency
Committee until the 1948 election. Making public housing options more accessible and more attractive for the wider population would be incompatible with the promotion of a mass homeownership society. In retrospect, the late 1940s, when the State of New Jersey sought a new possibility in public housing policy, was a transitional period in the U.S. housing history. It ended up in a victory of the business-oriented postwar vision. After the 1950s, a so-called two-tier housing policy, which on the one hand popularized private homeownership by guaranteeing mortgage insurance, while on the other hand provided a limited scale of public housing projects only available to those in the lowest-income brackets, gained ascendancy. 5 New Jersey witnessed such transformations. The homeownership rate in New Jersey was considerably lower than the U.S. average before World
War II, but since 1950 it has resembled rates typical throughout the United States. 6 This article addresses two closely related issues in the historiography of U.S. housing policy.
First, it emphasizes possibilities and uncertainty in the aftermath of World War II. It owes its basic concept of majority-oriented public housing to Gail Radford's accounts of the New Deal period.
While Radford believes that the 1937 Act represented a shift towards a two-tiered system, the findings in this New Jersey case shows that different possible paths still existed in the late 1940s.
Secondly, it explores the reasons why public housing for the broad and diverse population failed to be an option in the postwar American politics. Historians who focus on national-level politics have argued that disproportionately powerful conservatives and resourceful business themselves were responsible for this outcome. 7 To be sure, these traditional anti-New Deal forces played significant roles in decelerating reform politics. Not many scholars, however, have addressed how ordinary people viewed the policy controversies and why public attention to public housing faded have to raise broad-based endorsements from the public.
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The groups in the NJHC could not, however, reach an agreement on the issue of financing.
Some groups argued that the state housing program "can be 100% self-liquidating," and other groups asserted that at least some portion of the funds to reimburse the state housing bonds should "come out of the taxpayers' pocket." 27 A completely self-liquidating program would be more easily accepted by politicians, but it would impose tremendous limits on the scale, quality, and rent affordability of the state housing projects. Therefore, lack of agreement on using tax revenue made their vision less persuasive, especially because their goal was to create high-quality and low-rent public housing units that that were available to as many people as possible. The NJHC as a statewide association lobbied in Trenton and sent their messages through mass media, but it did not have a collective movement agenda to change public minds through the grass-roots activities of the local member groups. There were, however, significant differences.
New Jersey Housing Act of 1949
Advocates of low-rent and high-quality public housing suffered three major setbacks. The
Friedland bills appointed only public entities, like local housing authorities, as contractors to implement each housing project, but Driscoll's A-45 bill granted contractors priority in the following order: private builders, co-operatives, [quasi-public] housing corporations, redevelopment companies, municipalities and local housing authorities. This alteration clearly made it difficult for state and local governments to manage the projects directly. A-45 imposed no statutory limitation on the profits of private builders, which would affect rent levels and the quality of housing units. 33 Without limiting their profits, builders could hike rents and skimp on construction costs. Another setback was elimination of the anti-discrimination provision stipulated in the Friedland bills. The DCED could now give silent approval to white resident and local government demands for racial segregation. The last setback was a slum-clearance feature. "The Authority may require," A-45 stated, "that the site on which the project is to be erected is a blighted or slum area," and those who were living on such sites would be given the tenancy eligibility. bill restricted qualified tenants to "persons or families whose net annual income at the time of admission does not exceed five times the annual rental" including utilities (existing residents with family incomes 25 percent higher than this standard were allowed to stay). 35 Although the "fiveto-one" criterion was identical to the federal counterpart, the DCED could conceivably set a higher income cap, if the state determined to do so. Families with more than $3,500 annual income, for Meanwhile, the hearing exposed disagreement on the issue of financial resources among its proponents. The New Jersey Association of Housing Authorities, a group of local housing authorities in major cities, maintained that $100 million bond and state subsidies as prescribed in the proposed Driscoll legislation were insufficient, and that "a much larger public housing program … could be financed through the sale of [local] housing authority bonds, secured by a pledge of the State subsidy," which would be appropriated from state general funds. 42 On the other hand, the chairman of the NJHC, the state-wide coalition of pro-reform groups, insisted that financing the program could be "self-liquidating" and "will not require the imposition of any taxes nor cost the taxpayers of the State any moneys." 43 The NJ-CIO failed to obtain the consent of other groups for its plan to implement state income taxes to fund comprehensive social programs in New Jersey.
Proponents had failed at achieving consensus on funding resources even a year after the formation of the NJHC.
Suburban municipalities and business groups, such as private mortgage bankers, the real estate industry, building materials industry, and other business associations made up the opposition.
They opposed creating a state public housing program. A representative of the New Jersey State
League of Municipalities, an organization of high-level municipal officials predominantly from suburban areas, argued that the "fundamental doctrine of home rule" would be flagrantly violated 40 Ibid., 36-38, 45-48. 41 Ibid., 8-14. 42 Ibid., 126-139. 43 Ibid., 20-36.
by the provisions. He also criticized A-48 for its "unfair and unjust" tax proposal on the ground that "many of the municipalities will not participate in the program," implying that most of the suburban political leaders had no will to build state public housing in their localities even if the measure took effect. 44 group that called for overall tax reduction as well as support for the doctrine that "any plans to 44 Ibid., 66-70. 45 Ibid. 110-113. 46 Ibid., 83-85, 99-103. 47 Ibid., 79-83.
increase taxes be deferred until there has been broad-scale effort to economize in the cost of The second factor in the rejection of the referendum was the politics of racial exclusion that had produced an anti-public-housing sentiments among white residents especially along Anti-tax momentum among current and prospective homeowners, along with anti-public housing hysteria and the localism of homogeneous white communities, were key factors in the defeat of the housing bond proposal. While these explain reasons why many voters voted NO, it does not fully clarify the unexpectedly small number of voters who supported it. In 1949, nearly half of New Jersey's working-class populations still resided in central places, and corporate welfare systems did not cover many unorganized workers. Yet, proponents failed to evoke public interest in their own strongholds. To understand fully the defeat of the referendum, we need to examine the proponents' own weaknesses.
Proponents had two major weaknesses. First, they failed even among themselves to build consensus on how they would finance the housing. NJHC members split on the issue from its inception, failing to pursue the NJ-CIO's state income tax proposition that would not impose a division between urban renters and moderate-income homeowners. Therefore, they were unable to stake out an alternative financial vision to the Friedland and Driscoll bills, nor could they counter opponents' anti-tax campaign with a larger picture of fair financial redistribution. 69 Second, they failed to build grass-roots movements to arouse public interest in communities and workplaces.
Although the NJ-CIO was active in its public relations and lobbying on housing reforms, activities at the local level were few. Before the referendum, the NJ-CIO Political Action Committee (NJ-CIO-PAC) provided only one advertisement for local newspapers and a few direct mail communications to union members, and it organized no mass meetings or marches. invite public housing in their communities or to relocate their local resources to urban areas, and for some working-class homeowners, who had tight budgets. To be sure, well-healed opponents played a significant role. Yet, more important, the widespread acceptances of these concerns demonstrated that many people in New Jersey, including the white working-class, were being captured by a new American way of life -pursuing private homeownership in the suburbs rather than reforming urban dwelling environment and relying much more on private than public welfare. 
